The Impact of Digital Currency on the Financial System: Universal Decentralized Digital Currency, Is It Possible? by Li, Dejun et al.
Journal of Economics and Public Finance  
ISSN 2377-1038 (Print) ISSN 2377-1046 (Online) 
Vol. 5, No. 2, 2019 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf 
203 
 
Original Paper 
The Impact of Digital Currency on the Financial System: 
Universal Decentralized Digital Currency, Is It Possible? 
Dejun Li1*, Jianbao Huang1 & Lingcong Wang1 
1 School of Economics, Management and Law, University of South China, Hunan Hengyang, China  
* Dejun Li, School of Economics, Management and Law, University of South China, Hunan Hengyang, 
421000, China 
 
Received: April 20, 2019         Accepted: May 1, 2019         Online Published: May 10, 2019 
doi:10.22158/jepf.v5n2p203       URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jepf.v5n2p203 
 
Abstract 
With the continuous development of computer and blockchain technology, digital currency has gradually 
replaced some functions of legal tender. This paper investigated the impact and the feasibility of digital 
currency on the financial market. Combining the money demand theory of Karl Heinrich Marx and 
Milton Friedman respectively, we discussed the impact of electronic and cryptocurrencies on the amount 
of money in circulation. Then, through further empirical analysis, we conclude that in China, digital 
currency has a substitution effect on current deposits in the long term. Furthermore, the welfare effect 
level of different countries adopting different policies on digital currency is analyzed by using the local 
equilibrium model of tariff effect in small countries, and the policy choice of maximizing the total welfare 
level is discussed based on game theory. Finally, we put forward some suggestions on establishing the 
global financial supervision system. 
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1. Introduction  
In 2008, the global financial crisis broke out, and countries adopted quantitative and accommodative 
monetary policies in order to transfer losses. Advocates of non-nationalized private currencies believe 
that using blockchain technology to create private digital currencies could avert an economic crisis. The 
biggest feature of private money is decentralization, not relying on central bank credit, and is 
independent of the “currency” system under the central bank. The latest news shows that Bitcoin’s 
payment function is further recognized and supported. At present, merchants from more than 200 
countries accept bitcoin. There are more than ten well-operated trading platforms worldwide, and daily 
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currency is exchanged for bitcoin. The amount has exceeded 100,000 (in bitcoin), and the number is still 
growing. 
With the development of the digital economy, the emergence of a new type of private digital currency 
represented by “bitcoin” has replaced some of the functions of traditional currency. Digital currency 
based on blockchain technology, with its high transaction efficiency, low transaction cost, avoiding 
inflation to maintain wealth value, and privacy, has triggered the popularity of currency 
denationalization. 
However, the privacy of private digital currency can easily become a means of trading illegal activities, 
such as tax avoidance and money laundering. Decentralization makes it difficult for the government to 
regulate it, which in turn hinders it becoming a universal currency. 
Commodity and currency theory holds that money is the product of spontaneous market, and the general 
equivalent of separation in exchange, and is a widely accepted private commodity. Even in the era of 
credit money, private individuals can become credit providers. From the perspective of the currency 
issuer, the digital currency can be divided into a private digital currency and a legal digital currency. 
Therefore, in this paper, we will analyze the impact of digital currency on the economic system from 
the perspective of monetary quantity demand. 
 
2. Methodology 
First of all, we get inspiration from money demand theory of Karl Heinrich Marx and Milton Friedman 
respectively and build a mathematical model based on people’s money demand motivation. Analyze the 
impact of electronic currencies and cryptocurrencies on the amount of money in the economy. Then, 
adopting the method of empirical analysis and using the time series model to analyze the impact of 
bitcoin and electronic currency on different levels (M0, M1, M2) in China. 
Secondly, we use the local equilibrium analysis model of tariff effect in small closed economy 
countries, and take digital currency as a kind of commodity to analyze the difference of welfare level 
when the government and the public choose to accept or reject digital currency. Based on the game 
theory, the choice between the two parties to reach the Nash Equilibrium and maximize the actual 
welfare effect is analyzed. 
Thirdly, by analyzing the supervision of digital currency in the global market, we propose the 
regulation system of global digital currency financial market from the perspective of the process from 
the generation of digital currency to the circulation in the market. 
 
3. Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Analysis under the Financial System Model 
3.1 Analysis from the Perspective of Money Demand 
To construct a model that represents the financial system including the digital currency, we first consider 
the principle of currency circulation, that is: where does it come from and where does it go. Thus we 
remind the law of the circulation of money created by Karl Heinrich Marx:  
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MV = 𝑃𝑇 
(“M” represents the demand of money; “V” represents the Currency turnover rate within a certain period 
of time; “P” represents the Total commodity price level ; “T” represents the total volume of the goods and 
services in the market) 
The foundation of this formula is “Labor creates value” (Hao, 2017). In the period of metal currency, 
gold and silver were regarded as general equivalents and acted as the money. Money has five functions: 
measures of value, means of circulation, means of payment, means of storage, and world currency. This 
law of currency circulation points out that the function of the internal means of storage of money can be 
adjusted spontaneously according to the commodities circulating in the market, so that the money supply 
can be adapted to the actual demand. Therefore, inflation or deflation will not occur. Now that we are out 
of the monetary system of the gold standard, the addition of more electronic currency and 
cryptocurrencies further complicates the changes in currency demand which is exactly what we will 
discuss in the following paragraphs. Although this law is the circulation of old gold and silver currency, it 
is also useful in the circulation of symbol currency such as banknotes (Liao, 2012). It can still play an 
important role in inspiring our model. 
Another classic theory about the quantity of money was proposed by the American economist named 
Milton Friedman modern western economics (Milton & Anna, 1867-1960). 
𝑀
𝑃
= f(y,w, 𝑟𝑏, r𝑒 , 𝑟𝑚,
1
𝑝
×
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑡
, μ) 
(“M”: the demand of money; “P”: the total commodity price level; “y”: the nominal long-term income; 
“w”: the ratio of non-human wealth to total wealth; “𝑟𝑏”: the expected yield of the bond; “𝑟𝑒”: expected 
rate of return on bonds; “𝑟𝑚”: expected nominal rate of return on money; “
1
𝑝
×
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑡
”: expected rate of 
change in price levels; “μ”: Other factors affecting money demand) 
The digital currency we discussed can be divided into 2 kinds: one is the electronic currency 
corresponding to the central bank’s currency. The other is the virtual currency which is independent of 
the supply and demand system of currency. Whether it can make the transition to a real currency depends 
on people’s trust in bitcoin and confidence in the whole set of mechanisms (Gu, 2013). As a result, at this 
stage, cryptocurrencies have a relatively small impact on the amount of money in today’s market because 
of unresolved credit, regulatory, and stakeholder issues. With reference to the optimal money demand 
theory proposed by Hao (2017), we theoretically derive the impact of these two types of digital 
currencies on a closed economy. 
We assume that in a closed economy there are commodity markets, financial markets, Banks and the 
public. Money can circulate among these four areas. As shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The Circulation Model of Currency 
 
The currency in circulation in the commodity and service market includes: the public purchase and pay 
for goods and services from the manufacturers in the commodity market, at the same time, some of their 
income is deposited in the bank for interest, and some of the money is invested in the financial market 
such as stocks and bonds; Manufacturers in the commodity market mortgage part of their assets to Banks 
for financing, and use part of the funds to invest in stocks, bonds and options in the financial market; And 
a portion lost in circulation. Funds that can be considered relatively static for a given period of time 
include money accumulated in financial markets, reserves required by Banks for routine withdrawals, 
and funds reserved by individuals and firms for emergencies as a part of precautionary demand. Then the 
monetary demand formula can be expressed as: 
M =
𝑃𝑇
𝑉
+ 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 + 𝐶3 + 𝜇 
(The definition of M/P/T/V is the same as above; “𝐶1”: Precipitating money in financial markets; “𝐶2”: 
Bank reserve; “𝐶3”: Funds reserved by individuals for emergency response) 
We first talk about the first kind of money. Electronic currency is essentially an innovation of payment 
method, and its standard currency is still legal tender issued by the central bank.  
Electronic money has a major impact on V (the Currency turnover rate within a certain period of time), 
C1 (Precipitating money in financial markets), C2 (Bank reserve), C3 (Funds reserved by individuals for 
emergency response) & T (the total volume of the goods and services in the market). 
3.1.1 The Influence of Electronic Currency on “V” 
Third-party payment platforms such as Paypal (realized point-to-point instant transactions) and 
electronic payment methods such as bank cards, which were invented before, have undoubtedly 
accelerated the circulation of money. Services such as electronic wallets and online businesses are 
enabling people to go outside without having to carry cash. There is the substitution of electronic money 
for traditional currency. In China, transactions on the third-party payment platform which is built by 
Alibaba have grown exponentially since 2015. This leads to a reduction in the demand of money. 
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Figure 2. Third-party Mobile Payment Transaction Volume from 2011 to 2015 in China 
 
3.1.2 The Influence of Electronic Currency on “C2”, “C3” 
Security of electronic currency transaction is higher than that of traditional currency transaction. For one 
thing, it speeds up the transaction speed and thus reduces the risk of theft and pick pocketing. The second 
is that money recorded in electronic data greatly reduces the rate of current leakage. This makes banks 
reduce the amount of cash they need to prepare for daily withdrawals due to the accelerated speed of 
capital flow. And the demand for funds reserved for the public for emergencies also decreases further, 
which will lead to the decrease of M. 
3.1.3 The Influence of Electronic Currency on “C1” 
The development of electronic money is two-sided for financial markets. On the one hand, the 
development of electronic money accelerates the circulation of funds in the financial market, and the 
accumulated money in the financial market declines. On the other hand, for example, the conversion 
service of funds in Alipay (an electronic wallet) and Yu Ebao (an investment and wealth management 
tool) launched by Alibaba payment platform promotes the velocity of funds entering the financial market, 
so the impact on M is uncertain. 
3.1.4 The Influence of Electronic Currency on “T” 
These currency may be used to buy physical goods and services, but may also be restricted to certain 
communities such as for use inside an online game or a social network 
(https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_currency). It’s based on experience that the development of 
electronic currency has a positive impact on T.  
The second digital currency is cryptocurrency. The impact of cryptocurrencies on currency demand is 
mainly reflected in “C2”. Because both the issuer and the holder of cryptocurrency can be considered as 
the public, the issuer holding cryptocurrency such as bitcoin will reduce its demand for traditional 
currency. Buyers of cryptocurrencies will transfer part of their holdings of traditional currency to 
cryptocurrencies, resulting in a decrease in C2 and a decrease in M. This substitution is particularly 
evident in the current period of imperfect and incomplete information in the cryptocurrency market. Due 
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to the imperfect market and asymmetric information, there are a lot of arbitrage opportunities in the 
cryptocurrency market. Most of the motivation for people to hold cryptocurrencies are not to enter the 
market’s circulation system, but to speculate or invest.  
3.2 The Empirical Analysis 
In order to further explore the impact of digital currency on the amount of currencies, we conducted an 
empirical analysis on the impact of different currency levels based on the data of the transaction volume 
of China’s third-party payment platforms (TP) and the annual transaction volume of bitcoin in China 
(BT). Due to the rapid development of China’s third-party payment platforms since 2015, the change 
trend of its transaction volume is close to the exponential growth, so the logarithm of BT is taken in the 
model to reduce the difference in variation (Pang, 2014). 
1. Build the time series model 
M0t=β1+β2TPt+β3lnBTt+μi 
M1t=β4+β5TPt+β6lnBTt+μi 
M2t=β7+β8TPt+β9lnBTt+μi 
(M0: Cash in circulation (100 million yuan); M1: M0+Demand deposit (100 million yuan); M2: 
Currency and quasi money supply (including M1, Time deposit, savings deposit and other deposits); TP: 
Third-party mobile payment transaction volume (trillion); BT: Bitcoin annual circulation (per year)) 
2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
In order to eliminate the autocorrelation, the Unit Root Test is performed on M0, M1, M2. We used the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on them. 
 
 
Figure 3. ADF Test Results on M0 Detected by Eviews 8 
 
M0t: in the ADF test of explained variable M0, the results of the three models with minimum AIC, SC 
and HQ are selected. The results are stable after the test, the null hypothesis that M0t has unit root can be 
rejected at the significance level of 1%. That is, M0t is the stationary process under the model with 
intercept term and trend term {M0t}~I(0) 
Similarly, the stationarity test is carried out for other variables, and the results are as follow: 
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Table 1. The ADF Results of All Variables Detected by Eviews 8 
Variable ADF test 
statistic 
Prob 1% level 5% level 10% level Whether 
stable 
M0 -75.76739 0.0001 -8.235570 -5.338346 -4.187634 T 
M1 -0.661652 0.9053 -7.006336 -4.773194 -3.877714 F 
D(M1) -1.169311 0.5931 -5.604618 -3.694851 -2.982813 F 
D(M1,2) -1.815919 0.0727 -3.271402 -2.082319 -1.599804 T 
M2 -1.477748 0.7366 -7.006336 -4.773194 -3.877714 F 
D(M2) -1.662243 0.3914 -5.604618 -3.694851 -2.982813 F 
D(M2,2) -2.345690  0.0348 -3.271402 -2.082319 -1.599804 T 
BT 1.943270 0.9982 -8.235570 -5.338346 -4.187634 F 
D(BT) 1.427378 0.9880 -6.423637 -3.984991 -3.120686 F 
D(BT,2) 0.786261 0.8208 -3.563915 -2.157408 -1.610463 F 
lnBT  -2.874097 0.1120 -5.604618 -3.694851 -2.982813 T 
TP -3.331858 0.2176 -8.235570 -5.338346 -4.187634 F 
D(TP) -3.016093 0.1098 -6.423637 -3.984991 -3.120686 T 
 
3. Engle-Granger Co-integration Analysis 
After the ADF test on variables, the model is further tested by EG co-integration test to see if there is a 
co-integration relationship between the non-stationary explanatory variables and the explained variables. 
If there is, the error correction model between them will be established. OLS method was used to 
estimate the regression equation, and the residual sequence was obtained. ADF test was conducted on the 
residual sequence, and the results were as follows: 
The explained variable M0 conducts co-integration test on the two explanatory variables, and the unit 
root test of the residual sequence is obtained as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4. The Unit Root Test Results of the Explained Variable M0 on the Two Explained 
Variables Detected by Eviews 8 
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Since N=3, we calculated the result according to the C(α) threshold value and formula in the table of 
cointegration test thresholds provided by Mackinnon: 
C(α) = 𝜑∞ + 𝜑1𝑇
−1 + 𝜑2𝑇
−2 
(α: Significance level; T: Sample size; φ∞, φ1, φ2: The corresponding parameters provided in the table) 
Select significance level of 0.1 and calculate the critical value C(α): 
C(α) = −3.4518 − 6.241/7 − 2.79/(7^2) = −4.40031 
t = (−3.490385) > C(α) 
Therefore, M0 has no co-integration relationship with variables lnBT and TP. 
The explained variables M1 and M2 were co-integrated with two explanatory variables, lnBT and TP, 
respectively. Then we obtained the unit root test results of the residual sequence, which were combined 
with the above test results as follows. 
 
Table 2. Unit Root Test Results for All Variables Detected by Eviews 8 
Explained 
variables 
Explanatory 
variables 
t statistics C(α) Confidence 
level:α 
Whether there is a 
co-integration relationship 
M0 lnBT，TP -3.490385 -4.40031 0.1 F 
M1 lnBT，TP -5.009760 -4.40031 0.1 T 
M2 lnBT，TP -4.197227 -4.40031 0.1 F 
 
Therefore, the second regression model has a co-integration relationship, indicating that there is a 
long-term equilibrium relationship between explanatory variables and explained variables. 
However, in the short term, there may be imbalance in the model. In order to enhance the accuracy of the 
model, we established an error correction model to connect the changes of short-term factors affecting 
M1 with long-term changes. 
△M1t=β4+β5△TPt+β6△lnBTt+γect-1+εt 
(ec stands for residuals in the long-term relationship model) 
 
 
Figure 5. Long-term Error Correction Model Detected by Eviews 8 
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We can get the following results: 
D(M1)= 612.5626D(TP)- 8729.815(lnBT)- 0.816586EC(-1) 
t= (2.711640)     (-1.773662)        (-3.889476) 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.951664   Durbin-Watson stat: 3.096059 
After debugging, the sequence with the above lagging term (-1) is the short-term relationship regression 
model in the best form. The results show that BT (Bitcoin annual circulation) has a negative influence on 
explained variable M1 at the level of confidence about 70%.TP (third-party mobile payment transaction 
volume) has a positive effect on explained variable M1 at the confidence level of 78%. 
The above analysis has proved that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between the two 
variables affecting M1: lnBT and TP. On this basis, we use granger causality to further analyze whether 
there is causality between each explanatory variable and the explained variable and the direction of its 
influence. 
4. Granger causality test 
 
The core thinking of granger causality test is: if a change in X causes a change in Y, then the change in X 
should occur before the change in Y. The Granger causality test can only test the causal relationship 
between two or two variables. For the two-variable causality test, the causal relationship is judged by 
examining whether the α and λ parameters are all zero in the following two formulas. 
According to whether the α and λ parameters are all zero, there are four possibilities for the test results, 
and we mainly considered two of them in this paper: 
1) X has a single influence on Y, which is manifested as the parameter α before each lag term of equation 
(1) X is at least one of which is not zero, while the parameter λ before each lag term of equation (2) is all 
zero. 
2) There is no influence between Y and X, as shown in equation (1) and equation (2), parameter α and λ 
before each lag term of Y and X are all zero. 
A prerequisite for granger causality test is that the time series must be stationary, otherwise false 
regression may occur. According to the unit root test of the above variables, when the model becomes a 
two-order difference form, the time series is stable, so granger test is carried out between Y and X one by 
one. The test results are shown in the Table 3. 
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Table 3. Results of Granger Causality Test on the Second Regression Detected by Eviews 8 
Null hypothesis Lag period: 1 
D(lnBT) does not Granger Cause DM1 F-Statistic 0.55379 
Prob.  0.5927 
D(M1) does not Granger Cause D(lnBT) F-Statistic 1.98028 
Prob.  0.3933 
D(TP) does not Granger Cause D(M1) F-Statistic 0.49655 
Prob.  0.6092 
DM1 does not Granger Cause D(TP) F-Statistic 1.75216 
Prob.  0.4119 
 
We can see from the test results that there is no Granger causality for M1, whether it is BT or TP variable. 
5. Results analysis 
From the above test results, the following conclusions can be drawn: in the long run, the growth of 
electronic currency and cryptocurrency has an impact on M1, but has no relevant impact on M0 and 
M2.According to the definition of money level, M1 includes M0 and demand deposits, while M2 
includes M1 and time deposits, savings deposits and other deposits. Therefore, we can conclude that 
cryptocurrencies mainly have a substitution effect on residents’ demand deposits. 
In the short-term error correction model, the impact of electronic currency and cryptocurrency on M1 is 
not significant, but this is consistent with China’s national conditions. Electronic currency in China 
began to appear in 2013, and developed rapidly in 2015. By the end of 2017, it had a growth period of 
only three years. Although it has great potential for development, it has little impact on China’s huge 
monetary aggregates today. On December 5, 2013, the five ministries and commissions such as the 
People’s Bank of China issued a notice to prevent the risk of bitcoin. They supposed that Bitcoin is not 
issued by the monetary authority, has no legal and mandatory monetary attributes, and therefore is not a 
real currency, and cannot and should not be used as a currency in the market. As a result, bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies have a small amount of circulation in the real Chinese market, and their influence 
cannot affect the high level of current volume for the time being. Combined with theoretical analysis, we 
can see that both electronic currency and decentralized cryptocurrency have a small impact on the 
demand and supply of money today, and their development has a different impact on currency with 
different structures. However, in general, both electronic currency and cryptocurrency have a substitution 
effect on traditional currency. Their impact on the financial system is more obvious in currency and 
demand deposit due to the public’s liquidity preference for currency, so the monetary authorities should 
pay more attention to the change of this current level. 
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4. The Needs and Willingness of Different Countries to Adopt Digital Currency Financial Systems 
4.1 Based on The Game Theory, Analyze the Different Choices of Open Small Countries  
4.1.1 Modeling Ideas 
According to the local equilibrium model of tariff effect in small countries, for a small country with an 
open economy, if import tariffs are imposed to manage trade, the net effect of social welfare changes 
will be negative according to the welfare effect. Based on the analysis of a partial equilibrium of the 
effects of import tariffs on small countries as world price takers [7], small countries should maximize 
their own welfare under the free competition market structure, that is, carry out free trade. Using game 
theory analysis in the digital currency market equilibrium state, whether the government increased 
restrictions of digital currency which can lead to increasing its market price, and whether people choose 
to accept the digital currency, 4 circumstances had the impact on welfare levels. Then two different 
situations are proposed:  
1. The government and the public make the best choice for themselves based on the principle of 
maximizing their own interests, so that the overall welfare level can reach Nash Equilibrium. 
2. Both the government and the public make the choice to maximize the overall welfare level, 
which do not necessarily represent the best choice for them. 
4.1.2 Model Hypothesis 
1. The objects of analysis are divided into two categories: large countries and small countries 
(where policy changes by large countries can have an impact on supply and demand in world markets, 
and small countries do not). 
2. The digital currency market is in perfect competition 
3. Country H is a small open country under the economic globalization, and its internal demand 
change will not affect the price of digital currency in the world. 
4. Only consider the change of digital currency entering a certain country’s market, and carry out 
local equilibrium analysis. 
5. Take bitcoin as the only decentralized digital currency in this condition. Take bitcoin as a 
commodity and an alternative to money. 
4.1.3 Model Establishment 
Suppose P is the price of the transaction digital currency and Q is the number of transactions. 
P1 represents the equilibrium price under the government’s control, and Q4 represents its demand and 
Q1 represents supply. 
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Figure 6. Welfare Effect Model of Small Countries Adopting Digital Currency 
 
Assuming that bitcoin enters the currency market of country H, the supply curve and demand curve of 
domestic bitcoin faced by the market of country H are respectively represented by S and D. P3 is the 
cost to the domestic public when bitcoin is not used at all. If the domestic public does not accept digital 
currency, it means the benefits brought by the superiority of digital currency, such as the right of 
seigniorage and the transaction convenience of decentralized digital currency. And the welfare level of 
its users is g. Since the producers of bitcoin are not necessarily the domestic public, they need to 
consider independently: if the government does not control the entry of bitcoin and the public accepts 
bitcoin, the welfare level at this time is (a+b+c1+c2+m+f1+f2+e+g). If the government controls and the 
public accept bitcoin, because for the bitcoin producers, while the government controls the entry of 
bitcoin into the market, the price of bitcoin will rise further due to the continued demand. If the 
producers of bitcoin are the domestic public, the domestic public can enjoy the increased producer 
surplus. If the producers of bitcoin are in a foreign market, the producer surplus made up of this part 
will be enjoyed by foreign producers.  
However, it must be pointed out that the welfare level of bitcoin recipients in the second case will not 
be lower than that in the case where the domestic public does not accept bitcoin. Therefore, we 
consider the impact of decisions made by the country’s subjects on the overall welfare level under the 
strictest circumstances. This is why the analysis of producer surplus is not included in our game theory 
model. 
When the domestic people use bitcoin and the government does not control it, the cost of bitcoin 
entering the domestic market is P1. At this time, the cost can be regarded as the cost of bitcoin 
production. The government loses the rights such as seigniorage, so the government’s fiscal revenue is 
zero. After the government strengthened its control over the entry of bitcoin into the currency market, 
the benefits of currency purchasers decreased by (a+b+c1+c2+m), while the government revenue 
increased by (c1+c2); If people do not accept digital currency, their welfare is g and government 
income is 0. 
The government does not strengthen its control over the entry of bitcoin into the currency market, and 
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the government welfare is 0. Currency buyers accept digital currency with the benefits of 
(a+b+c1+c2+fi+f2+m+e+g). If it is not accepted, the benefit is g. 
 
Table 4. The Effect Matrix of the Game Theory 
Government/public Accept/ Reject 
Control c1+c2, g+e+f1+f2 0, g 
No Control 0, a+b+c1+c2+f1+f2+m+e+g 0, g 
 
According to the Nash Mixed Equilibrium, the probability that the government controls the circulation 
of digital currency in the country is A, and the probability that the government does not control the 
circulation of digital currency in the country is (1-A). The probability that people choose to accept 
digital currency is B, and the probability that people choose not to accept digital currency is (1-B), then 
the expected payment of the government is: 
𝑈𝑔 = 𝐴𝐵(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) 
𝜕𝑈𝑔
𝜕𝐴
= 𝐵(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) 
The public’s expected payment is: 
𝑈𝑝 = 𝐵[𝐴(𝑔 + 𝑒 + 𝑓1 + 𝑓2) + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 + 𝑓1 + 𝑓2 +𝑚 + 𝑒 + 𝑔)]
+ (1 − 𝐵)[𝐴𝑔 + (1 − 𝐴)𝑔] 
𝜕𝑈𝑝
𝜕𝐵
= (1 − 𝐴)(𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 +𝑚) + 𝑓1 + 𝑓2 + 𝑒 
In equilibrium, the mixed strategy is: A=1, B=1. At this time, the mixed strategy will converge to a pure 
strategic Nash Equilibrium, in which the government chooses to control the circulation of digital 
currency in the country and the public decides to accept digital currency. This increase in government 
revenue comes at the expense of a smaller consumer surplus, which ultimately leads to a decline in the 
country’s overall welfare. 
Here comes to the conclusion. For a small country with an open economy, the best strategy to 
maximize the level of social welfare is that the government does not control the circulation of bitcoin, 
and the resulting social welfare is the largest. This is in line with the principle that small countries 
should adopt free trade policies in order to maximize their own welfare in a competitive market. 
Although import tariffs imposed by small countries will increase domestic production fiscal revenue, 
on the whole they will lead to a net loss of economic welfare and a decline in the welfare level of the 
country. 
4.2 Further Discussion of Models for Different Types of Countries  
In the model of local equilibrium welfare effect of small countries, the policy changes adopted by small 
countries on bitcoin cannot change the world terms of trade. However, if large countries adopt control 
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policies for bitcoin, as its demand accounts for a large proportion of the world market demand, the 
demand for bitcoin will decline in a global scale, thus greatly impeded the liquidity of bitcoin, and its 
price will further drop to a lower level than the original world market price. At this time, the fiscal 
revenue obtained by the government under the condition of the control of bitcoin will change from 
(c1+c2) to (c1+c2+n1+n2). In the case that the producer surplus is still not discussed, the net effect of 
government tightening restrictions and people’s acceptance of bitcoin on social welfare is: 
(g+e+f1+f2+c1+c2+n1+n2)-(a+b+c1+c2+f1+f2+m+e+g)-a=(n1+n2)-(b+m) 
Therefore, the choice of big countries and people to maximize their welfare in digital currency depends 
on the comparison between (n1+n2) and (b+m). 
 
5. The Regulatory Regime for Global Digital Financial Markets 
5.1 Regulatory Background 
Globally, digital currency is growing at a faster pace and cost the least compared to other currencies. At 
present, there are 259 kinds of digital currency services in 89 countries around the world. In order to 
ensure the standard development of the digital currency market, all the major countries (regions) in the 
world have incorporated the digital currency market into the regulatory system. However, digital 
currency crime still emerges in an endless stream, especially transnational crime, which increases the 
regulatory difficulty. Brazil, Spain, China and other places have seen digital currency fraud. Money 
laundering and other criminal ACTS, and even individual digital currency exchanges were attacked by 
hackers, extortion. 
5.2 Global Digital Currency Regulatory System 
In view of the unclear legal status of digital currency market, the lack of centralized management 
institutions, the defects of anonymous transactions, the vulnerability to hacker attacks, transnational 
circulation and other characteristics, we believe that it is still necessary to establish a unified global 
digital currency supervision system: 
 
 
Figure 7. Digital Currency Supervision System 
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National Supervision: 
1. Legal Supervision: 
1) The legal status of digital currencies should be clarified, independent regulatory bodies should be 
established, relevant rules and regulations should be formulated, and sanctions should be imposed on 
those who use Internet technologies to destabilize the digital currency market or harm the interests of 
holders. 
2) Establish and improve laws on digital currency actively and crack down on money laundering, tax 
avoidance and other illegal and criminal activities involving the use of digital currency. 
2. Release Process 
1) Establish a review mechanism for issuers and set a threshold for entry into the numerical financial 
market. 
2) Referring to the traditional way of money risk management by banks, an electronic money reserve 
system is established, and legislation is made to make each digital currency issuing entity pay a deposit to 
the central bank. 
3. Market and Circulation 
1) Establish digital currency trading institutions and trading information disclosure mechanism. 
2) Implement credit rating of the issuing subjects of digital currency and monitor risks of digital currency 
in real time. 
International Regulation: 
1) Establish a global digital currency transaction information sharing platform, and use extensive data to 
analyze digital currency transaction information. 
2) Strengthen the mechanism for regulatory cooperation and joint enforcement of cross-border crime 
involving digital currency. 
3) Bring bitcoin into the global financial regulatory system. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Whether the digital currency system can be widely established is always a controversial issue. In this 
paper, we use different perspectives and methods to discuss the impact of digital currency on the 
economic system, the different welfare levels generated by different choices of digital currency in 
different countries, and the establishment of a global digital currency financial market regulation system. 
First, combining the money demand theory of Karl Heinrich Marx and Milton Friedman respectively, 
concluded that electronic money would reduce money demand by affecting the total volume of the goods 
and services in the market, bank reserve, and Funds reserved by individuals for emergency response. 
Cryptocurrencies mainly affect the decline in money demand through bank reserve. Then, through 
further empirical analysis, we conclude that in China, digital currency has no influence on the amount 
of money in the market in the short term, while it has a substitution effect on current deposits in the 
long term. This change is mainly due to the public’s liquidity preference for money, so the monetary 
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authority can pay more attention to the change of money at this level. 
Based on the theory of local equilibrium of import tariff in small countries, this paper establishes a 
model to analyze the difference in welfare level caused by the choice of adopting digital currency 
between the government and the public. Based on game theory, we conclude that when the two reach 
the Nash Equilibrium, the government’s restriction on the access of digital currency to the market and 
people’s willingness to use digital currency can’t maximize the overall welfare level, which can only be 
achieved when small countries have no barriers to digital currency. We further discuss the model for 
different types of countries. 
Finally, based on the defects of digital currency, such as the decentralized supervision institution, 
hacker attack, etc., we established a global digital currency supervision system, including two parts: 
national supervision and international supervision. Hope to be helpful to the establishment of the 
supervision system in this respect. 
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